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 Abstract 
In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not 
‘natural kinds’. Here I clarify what I mean by ‘natural kind’, suggest a new 
and more accurate term and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions 
are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories. 
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1. Introduction 
It is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under 
the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to 
allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions, or so I have argued 
(Griffiths, 1997). The psychological, neural, ecological, evolutionary and 
other theories that best explain any particular subset of human emotions will 
not adequately explain the whole range of human emotions. In a slogan, 
emotions are not a ‘natural kind’. The same may be true of many more 
specific emotion categories, such as anger and love. On some occasions 
when it might be properly said in common speech that a person is angry, 
certain theories will adequately explain that person’s state. On other 
occasions of anger, however, other theories will be needed. In earlier work I 
have described my position as a form of eliminitivism about emotion, 
because it implies that the term ‘emotion’ and some specific emotion terms 
like ‘anger’ are examples of  ‘partial reference’. The term ‘jade’ is the 
standard example of partial reference. ‘Jade’ may be either of two different 
stones, jadeite or nephrite, and the term ‘jade’ partially refers to each of 
these two kinds of stone. It follows from this fact that for the purposes of 
geology or chemistry, jade cannot be treated as a single kind of thing. The 
properties of the two minerals have to be investigated separately, their 
geological origins explained separately and their abundance in unexplored 
geological deposits predicted separately. In a similar fashion, the sciences of 
the mind will have to develop separate theories of the various different kinds 
of emotion and also of the various different kinds of some particular 
emotions. In the same sense that there is really no such thing as jade, only 
jadeite and nephrite, there is no such thing as emotion, only affect programs, 
domain specific biases in motivation, socially sustained pretences and other 
more specific categories of psychological state and process that have been 
identified or hypothesized in the varied literature that sets out to addresses 
human emotion. 
 
While the critical response to my book has been generally positivei, most 
commentators have remained unconvinced by the argument that emotion is 
not a natural kind. In many cases this seems to reflect different 
understandings of what it is to be a ‘natural kind’. Some critics have been 
concerned to establish that there is a single domain of related phenomena to 
be studied by a discipline of ‘affective science’ or ‘ affective neuroscience’ 
(Charland, 2002). I have argued elsewhere that even if correct, this is 
consistent with the claim that that, like the domain of ‘memory science’, the 
domain of ‘affective science’ encompasses several different phenomena that 
it is important to distinguish (Griffiths, In Press-b). 
 
Other critics take me suggest that if emotion is not a natural kind, and thus 
not subject to a unified scientific explanation, then the concept is unviable in 
any cognitive role whatsoever. In a brief but thoughtful review, John Doris 
points out that ‘Griffith’s argument from heterogeneity to eliminativism 
applies too widely - the same style of argument might be applied to any 
number of seemingly viable concepts’ (Doris, 2000, 618). He gives the 
examples of ‘game’ and ‘cancer’. ‘Cancer’ is probably not a good example 
for his purpose. While there are many specific cancers, they are all cases in 
which cell lineages escape the mechanisms that normally control the 
proliferation and differentiation of somatic cell lines. Lenny Moss has 
recently outlined the various overarching conceptions of the control of 
development at the cellular level that have guided oncology research in the 
past century (Moss, 2002). If it were to turn out that certain cancers conform 
to one of these fundamental conceptions of cellular pathology whilst other 
cancers conform to another, it would not only be important for medical 
professionals to grasp that ‘cancer’ had been discovered to denote two very 
different cellular-level phenomena, it would probably be important for 
patients to understand it too, since it would almost certainly have 
implications for treatment and prognosis. If such a discovery were made, the 
continuing use of the word undifferentiated term ‘cancer’ might, indeed, be 
something to discourage (I should stress that I am not suggesting that 
different cancers actually conform to different fundamental conceptions of 
the nature of cancer).  
 
The example of ‘game’ is more apposite, because there is clearly no reason 
to discourage its use even though, as Wittgenstein famously showed, it is 
very far from denoting a group of things that are all ‘of the same kind’.  
Once one considers the full range of things that can be counted as ‘games’ it 
is quite a challenge to say why it is epistemically or pragmatically valuable 
to have a single term for such a broad category, rather than different terms 
for sports, pastimes, etc. ‘Emotion’ represents a similarly complex and 
productive conceptual challenge. As I mentioned at various points in my 
1997, anthropologists and social constructionist psychologists have made a 
number of valuable contributions to understanding the social functions of the 
emotion category. Many of these center on its role in removing behavior 
from the realm of blame and responsibility. Perhaps as a matter of 
conceptual analysis it is illuminating to look at the category of emotion not 
referentially, but in terms of the role played by classifying behavior as 
emotional in a set of social practices.  
 
Doris suggests just such an account of the emotion category: it derives its 
unity from a role in normative practices such as self-criticism, rather than 
from any role it may have in describing and explaining behavior. This line of 
thought, however, seems to me more a valuable complement to my claim 
that emotion is not a natural kind of psychological state or process, rather 
than an objection to it.  While I did not explore this aspect of the subject in 
my earlier book, I did stress that, “...scientific understanding is not the sole 
or main goal of everyday life. Vernacular emotion concepts serve other 
purposes besides those of explanation and induction. The future 
development of these concepts is unlikely to be as simple as their refinement 
or replacement by the concepts best suited to scientific understanding.” 
(Griffiths, 1997, 228). I will return to this theme in section four. First, 
however, I want to clarify what I mean by ‘natural kind’ before suggesting a 
new term that may better convey this meaning.  
 
2. What do I mean by ‘natural kind’? 
I use the term ‘natural kind’ to denote categories which admit of reliable 
extrapolation from samples of the category to the category as a whole. In 
other words, natural kinds are categories about which we can make inductive 
scientific discoveries. This usage is in direct line of descent from the 
initiators of the modern discussion of natural kinds in the 1840s, John Stuart 
Mill and William Whewell. The existence and importance of what Mill 
called ‘ real kinds’ was one of the few topics in the philosophy of science on 
which these two authors agreed.  The proper objects of investigation in the 
inductive sciences are those “classes in which we have not a finite but an 
inexhaustible body of resemblances amongst individuals, and groups made 
by nature, not by mere definition.” (Whewell, [1860] 1971, 290) 
 
Whewell’s brief definition perfectly expresses the two, linked ideas that I 
intended to convey when I used the term ‘natural kind’ in my earlier work. 
First, good scientific categories have the property that the criteria we use to 
judge whether an individual is a member of the category do not exhaust what 
unites all the members of that category. Second, the ability to clearly define 
a category is neither necessary nor sufficient to make that category a 
productive object of scientific inquiry. Hence it came as a considerable 
surprise to me when some philosophers took my argument that emotion is 
not a natural kind to be premised on the claim that ‘emotion’ lacks a clear 
definition, as Martha Nussbaum does in the following attempt to show that 
my position is internally inconsistent: 
 
‘It is particularly odd that Griffiths, who is a stern critic of the reliance 
on ordinary use and ordinary conceptions should rely on them himself 
in a quite uncritical way when arguing that the category “emotion” 
contains such great heterogeneity that no interesting single account is 
possible. He uses the word quite loosely in order to establish that the 
things falling under it are multiple and not unified; and yet it is he 
who holds that our loose use is not to be trusted.’ (Nussbaum, 2001, 8) 
 
But issues of vagueness and ‘loose use’ are simply irrelevant when assessing 
whether something is a natural kind. The Aristotelian category of 
‘superlunary objects’ can be defined by a single necessary and sufficient 
condition – being outside the orbit of the moon – but it ceased to be a natural 
kind with Galileo’s astronomical discoveries. Conversely, the history of the 
gene concept might not unreasonably be summed up by saying that the more 
clearly ‘gene’ has been defined, the more quickly that definition has been 
refuted (Falk, 1986; Falk, 2000). But the study of this ill-defined category 
has been fantastically productive. The question about emotion, therefore, is 
not whether we can give a single ‘account’ of the category in the sense of a 
philosophical analysis of the emotion concept, but whether the category thus 
singled out is a productive object of scientific enquiry. 
 
In my 1997 I built on the work of several other philosophers and scientists to 
construct a detailed account of natural kinds in psychology and biology, an 
account further elaborated in (Griffiths, 1999, 2001) and briefly sketched 
here. The fundamental scientific practices of induction and explanation 
presume that some of the observable correlations between properties are 
‘projectible’ (Goodman, 1954). That is, correlations observed in a set of 
samples can be reliably ‘projected’ to other instances of the category. 
Scientific classifications embody our current understanding of where such 
projectible clusters of properties are to be found. The species category, for 
instance, classifies organisms into sets that reliable cluster as yet 
undiscovered morphological, physiological and behavioral properties. These 
properties of the species can be discovered by studying a few members of 
the species.  
 
The traditional requirement that natural kinds be the subjects of 
spatiotemporally universal and exceptionless laws of nature would leave few 
natural kinds in the biological and social sciences where generalizations are 
often exception-ridden or only locally valid. Fortunately, it is easy to 
generalize the concept of a law of nature to the notion that statements are to 
varying degrees ‘lawlike’ (have counterfactual force). This allows a broader 
definition of a natural kind. A category is (minimally) natural if it would be 
reasonable to place some degree of reliance on some inductive predictions 
about unobserved instances. This, of course, is a very weak condition. Very 
many ways of classifying the world are minimally natural. The aim is to find 
categories that allow reliable predictions in a large domain of properties. 
The classic examples of natural kinds, chemical elements and biological 
species, meet these desiderata 
 
It is important to note that categories are natural relative to specific 
domain(s) of properties to which they are connected by background theories. 
The category of domestic pets is not a good category for investigating 
morphology, physiology or behavior, but might be a natural category in 
some social psychological theory or, of course, in a theory about 
domestication. Similarly, emotion is not a natural kind relative to the 
domains of properties that are the focus of investigation in psychology and 
the neurosciences, or so I have argued.  For emotion to be a natural kind in 
this sense, it would need to be the case that the psychological states and 
processes encompassed by the vernacular category of emotion form a 
category which allows extrapolation of psychological and neuroscientific 
findings about a sample of emotions to other emotions in a large enough 
domain of properties and with enough reliability to make emotion 
comparable to categories in other mature areas of the life sciences, such as 
biological systematics or the more robust parts of nosology. 
 
3. From Natural Kinds to Investigative Kinds 
The term ‘natural kind’ carries a lot of unwelcome baggage. To many 
philosophers it suggests a concern with the most fundamental kinds of the 
physical sciences, kinds far removed from everyday human activity and even 
from the mere terrestrial process of evolution (Ellis, 2001). To other 
philosophers the term ‘natural kind’ implies a single best taxonomy of nature 
independent of any particular human purposes (Dupré, 1993). Neither of 
these ideas is tightly connected to my own two concerns: the need for 
reliable property correlations for induction and explanation and the fact that 
whether a category has a clear definition and sharp boundaries is orthogonal 
to whether it is scientifically useful. For something to be a natural kind in 
this sense it is sufficient, as Richard Boyd has stressed, that there exist a 
cluster of correlated properties and that we can offer some, defeasible 
justification for extrapolating those correlations (Boyd, 1991, 1999) see also 
(Wilson, 1999). Biological species are natural kinds, I have argued, simply 
because current theory provides ample reason to suppose that the successes 
to date in investigating the properties of living systems by extrapolating 
from samples of one species to the rest of that species are not accidental! 
This is true despite the fact that the very same theories strongly suggest that 
species have no definitive ‘nature’. Any property of a species may exhibit 
diversity within the species at a time and may evolve over time. Species 
merely represent the intersection of several processes that cause biodiversity 
to be ‘clumpy’, the process of heredity being perhaps the most important of 
these. In the same way, the parts of animals, such as the liver, the human 
expression of surprise, and, I would argue, the primate disgust response, are 
best regarded as biological homologues: characteristics that arose at some 
point in evolution and that now mark out more or less reliably the set of 
organisms ‘downstream’ of that evolutionary event. 
 
This conception of a natural kind is intended not as a contribution to 
metaphysics but as a contribution to the philosophy of science. Inductive 
enquiry presumes that there are projectible properties, which is as much as to 
say that there are some categories that are natural kinds in the sense just 
outlined. This realization yields insights into the nature of scientific concepts 
and of conceptual change in science. The actual name ‘natural kind’ has 
been rendered increasingly inappropriate by what Boyd has termed the 
‘enthusiasm’ for the concept to which it refers (Boyd, 1991).  The insights 
into scientific practice that can be obtained from the ‘natural kind’ model are 
applicable not only to the natural sciences, but also to the human sciences. 
They are even applicable to those parts of the human sciences in which, as 
Ian Hacking has pointed out, the practices of classifying and theorizing feed 
back into substantive changes in the subject matter of those sciences 
(Hacking, 1992; Hacking, 1995). Given the historical baggage that attaches 
to the term ‘natural kind’ and its literal inappropriateness to many of the 
scientific categories to which it is now applied, it seems preferable to 
introduce an alternative.  
 
One possibility would be to recruit Hans Jörg Rheinberger’s term ‘epistemic 
object’ (Rheinberger, 1997).  Rheinberger uses this phrase to refer to 
entities, like the gene, that enter science as targets of research – putative 
entities that are discussed and investigated through certain experimental 
practices. Stating at the outset a precise theoretical definition would vitiate 
the whole purpose of an epistemic object. Nor can such objects be defined 
operationally, since that would tie them to a particular set of experimental 
practices that will likely be superceded (this is not to deny the very real role 
of ‘operational definitions’ in science, merely to deny that these cognitive 
tools are aptly named.) The idea of an epistemic object as something that 
cannot be defined but only investigated is certainly resonant with the idea of 
a natural kind that I have outlined above. However, Rheinberger has 
associated this term very strongly with a non-referential view of language. 
Epistemic objects are not merely investigated through a set of experimental 
practices, but constituted by those practices. There is no reason to link the 
account of natural kinds sketched above to a rejection of scientific realism. 
A commitment to scientific realism is no impediment to recognizing that 
natural kind concepts are open-ended, in the sense that any account of what 
it is to be a member of the kind may be refuted by new empirical findings. 
 
A more neutral substitute for ‘natural kind’ that carries many of the right 
connotations is ‘investigative kind’ (Brigandt, In Press). This term highlights 
the fact that the emphasis in the model of natural kinds outlined above is on 
open-ended investigation. A natural kind concept is a concept that it makes 
sense to seek to clarify through empirical inquiry. Such concepts are 
ongoing projects of inquiry in which extension and intension are altered to 
preserve inductive and explanatory power. The extension of a natural kind 
concept should change to ensure that the instances of the kind reliably 
possess a rich cluster of the properties the kind is used to investigate. 
Untranscribed regulatory regions in the genome, for example, fit the criteria 
for classical Mendelian genes. But now that it is possible to describe the 
genetic material and its activities at the molecular level, these sequences 
stand in stark contrast to sequences that template for polypeptides and other 
functional gene products. Hence, it seems, these sequences are no longer 
classified as genes (Waters, 1994). The intension of a natural kind concept 
may need to be altered to reflect the fact that the background theories that 
license treating a category as a natural kind have altered. It is clear that in 
pre-Darwinian biology the particular historical origins of taxa were not 
essential to those taxa. Today, however, nearly all the competing accounts of 
systematics accept as a necessary condition of taxon membership a shared 
origination at a particular point in a genealogical network. The fact that 
members of a taxon share a common ancestor is a central part of the network 
of theory that licences extrapolating from a sample to the whole. Hence that 
shared origin is treated as a defining feature of the taxon (Griffiths, 1999). 
 
In the remainder of this article I will use Brigant’s term ‘ investigative kind’ 
rather than ‘natural kind’. Amongst its other virtues, the new term nicely 
captures what seems to be the predominant attitude to ‘definitions’ of 
emotion in the scientific literature: “we must sharpen our conceptual tools as 
best we can and have faith that in using them to untangle the complexity [of 
emotional behavior] we shall see how to fashion better ones.” (Hinde, 1985, 
990) 
 
4.  Emotion as a normative kind 
Dominic Murphy and Stephen Stich have suggested that arguments similar 
to those I have offered concerning emotion show that ‘mental illness’ or 
‘psychopathology’ does not represent a ‘natural kind’ of psychological or 
neurological processes. They conclude, however, that in this case the 
category remains valuable as a normative kind, since it brings together all 
the processes that are “ways of going wrong” (Brown et al., 1999, 25 their 
emphasis). Building on this suggestion, John Doris has argued that all 
instances of the vernacular category of anger may form a single kind for the 
purposes of asking, for example, whether anger is warranted by the situation 
at hand. Similarly, he suggests, all ‘negative emotions’ may share the 
normative feature that we wish not to experience them. This is an important 
point, and it is clear that emotion categories do function as normative kinds 
in this sense. However, I will try to show here that this does not provide any 
basis for rejecting my view that emotion is not a single investigative kind, 
but rather complements and enriches that view. I will suggest that, firstly, 
normative kinds are open ended in the same way as investigative kinds, 
although for different reasons; Secondly, emotions are simultaneously 
investigative and normative kinds; Thirdly, the two kinds of conceptual 
dynamics interact, so that the realization that emotion (or some particular 
emotion) is not a single investigative kind will impact on its role as a 
normative kind. 
 
Normative kinds are open-ended because normative projects as well as 
epistemic projects provide motives for altering extension and intension. Just 
as a category can be altered for the sake of inductive power, a category can 
be altered, for example, as part of a project of social reform. Ian Hacking has 
presented a valuable case study of such a change in the evolving definition 
of child abuse from the 1960s to the present day (Hacking, 1992). The 
change from viewing a pattern of childcare as normal to viewing it as 
abusive need not reflect an epistemic project, such as maximizing the 
predictive power of the child abuse as a diagnostic category in psychiatry. 
The change can equally well represent the spread of a new normative model 
of the relationship between parent and child, or a change in the relative value 
placed on various traits of the older child or adult, such as placing a higher 
value on personal fulfillment and a lower value on social conformity.  
 
It is unlikely that description and prescription can be cleanly separated. The 
very same ‘human kinds’ (Hacking, 1998b) are used to predict and explain 
human behavior and to prescribe and condemn that behavior. This is self-
evident in the case of many emotion categories, such as love, jealousy or 
Doris’s example of anger. There are normative criteria for whether anger is 
warranted and perhaps also normative standards about how to behave in 
anger, but there is also a body of common sense about what actually makes 
people angry and about how angry people actually behave. Diagnostic 
psychiatric categories provide another rich source of examples. There are 
both skeptics and enthusiasts about the diagnosis of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), but surely neither group would deny that the 
diagnosis came into being as the result of a perception that certain behavior 
was unacceptable. The issue that separates them is how much these children 
have in common and how much they differ from other children, over and 
above the fact that their behavior is unacceptable. 
 
Given that the very same categories serve as both investigative kinds and 
normative kinds, the remaining issue is how such categories behave when 
the investigative projects in which they serve pull them in one direction and 
the normative projects pull them in another. Doris seems to envisage that 
anger would be retained as a single normative category even if it were 
discovered that different instances of anger are very different 
psychologically. This seems to me unlikely both from a consideration of this 
particular case and on general grounds. In this specific case, the nature of the 
psychological processes underlying anger is directly relevant to whether the 
behavior is voluntary and thus to its normative status. Suppose it comes to 
be believed that certain cases of anger represent a highly automated, species-
typical response of some natural subset of human beings. It is not hard to 
imagine such a picture being accepted for the following kind of anger: A 
young male is waiting in line outside a nightclub. Someone unexpectedly 
pokes him sharply in the small of the back. He spins around, making a threat 
expression, probably the ‘square-mouthed’ variety that represents 
subordinate threat in chimpanzees. His body adjusts physiologically for 
violent action. Now suppose that a young woman has fallen against him and 
is smiling and apologizing profusely. The episode of anger is over almost 
immediately. Accepting the model of what happened in this episode 
associated with the ‘affect program’ theory of basic emotions seems to me to 
move it into an entirely different normative category from many other 
episodes of anger. I can imagine someone arguing that it simultaneously 
removes this instance from the category of true anger, but since this implies 
that no chimpanzee is ever truly angry that seems merely a backhanded way 
to admit that there is more than one kind of anger. More generally, I suggest 
that normative judgments about emotion are no more likely to be 
independent of our beliefs about the nature of emotion than normative 
beliefs about gender or race are independent of our scientific beliefs about 
the validity and nature of those categories. 
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